

No. 1

Ex 1343A

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聯合軍翻訳通訳部
南西太平洋地区

敵刊物

第三二号 一九四三年八月一日(昭和十八年)

目次

蘭領印度作戦二號

一九四二年二月乃至三月

某陸軍中佐、蘭印作戦二号スル報告、締込未了手記

大及毎日新聞ヨリ、譲り受けタル

(ホーリーテッタ 一九四二年十一月十九日)

シドニーエアポートハル大佐

通信隊聯絡長

Laney

e

軍令部近見記
軍使ナル降服

午後四時我之ハ飛行場ニ至る。司令部ハ飛行場、側ニアア。司令部、一、部屋ニハ蘭印、高級將校若干ト外ニ平服ヲ着ケト十人位、人が居テ私ハ初メテ此處ニ總督が居テ、とて驚ケタ。向モナク蘭印航空監督校、某特校完テ敵總督並ニ部下十人也。夫ハ綺麗ナル屋内ア。中央ニ長子がア。軍司令官、軍參謀長及び連隊長、部隊長、三人、將官が右側、席ニシテ。ソノ後ニ參謀將校が着席シ。スマルケンベルク / STARKENBERG / 總督トソ、部下が入テキア。軍司令官、同側ニハ總督、左ハアルボーテ心 / TERPOOTEN / 軍司令長官、次ニ各參謀將校が居テ。ソニテ敵、各幕僚、文官ハ後ニ立テサ。總督ト司令長官ハト、程度、權限ヲ彼等が有シテイカニ就イテ今村 / IMAMURA / 司令官、証内ヲ受ケタ。總督ハ不可思議ナコトベアルが最高指揮、大權ヲ持テイナバ旨を達ヘタ。昔カラ陸軍ト文治ハ蘭印總督、寺中ニアアカ海軍、ミハ女王、直接監督下アントハコトハ謂籍トコトアル。ホーリーが事件ヲ起シワーヴル / WAVELL / が皆ニア時、責任回避アシムトウカハ知テナ。ソニテ再度軍司令官が實下ハ更條件降服ヲスルカト証ニシ得總督、辟ニ首ヲ振シタ。次ニ總督ハ發言ニテ「才薄シテ下サハ、戸口、例ニ報道員カ通商貿易が居ル、テハナイスカソレナラ追拂」テ下サハ將軍ハ証ネテ「シテラ實下ハ何故未トシ總督ハ云々

N.2

Doc. 2674A

No. 3

シテ「實下カ私ニハトテ私ハ招請ヲ受ケラ未クアズ。私ハ「三十六」/JAVA/民政廳ト本件ヲ商議スル計画デミ。」
ト彼ハ言ヒ通シタ。

次ニ總督ハ軍司令長官ニ向ニ實下、其條件降服スルカ
ト尋ニタ。「何卒バニシ」/BANDUNG/、「降服ヲ受諾スルダク
ニテ下サ」。〔我ハ、南スル限リバニシ」/BANDUNG/、地域ハ向
題デハシ。」唯一、向題ハ實下が眞條件降服ニ肯ニスルカ、又ハ
蘭印、降服ヲ拒否スルカトベコト。彼ハ云々「我ハ日本
軍、敵テハナイトハコトヲ私ハ良フ知テ居リス。」、時總
督ハ軍司令長官ヲ銃ドヲ凝視シ。總督ハ向回訊向ナテモ
「ハシム」/BANDUNG/休戦、ミロスルダケダツタ。

今村/IMAMURA/將軍ハ嚴カニ言シテ「以上誠向ナテモ
駄テアル。實下が眞條件降服ニ肯ニシナハラバ攻撃ヲ繼續
スル以外ニテ法ハナリ。實下、司令官達ハ即刻ハシム」/BAND
UNG/、「歸還相成リタ。歩哨線ニテ實方ヲ我ろ、軍隊テ
護衛シテ上カヘフカ、實ろガ歩哨線ニ至リテナリバ、爆弾ヲ
燃者シテ飛行場ニ待機シテ居ル航空機ヲ以テハシム」
攻撃シテ、然ニ私ハ實方考慮スベキ最後、機会ヲ失ヘス。
最後、決心ヲナスメ=私ハ今カラ十分向ニ實方ニ支ケス。
ソウ云ヒテから彼、今村ハ起上ガツ。十分経ツト、今村ハ直立
シテ總督、方ニ向キマシ。〔我ニハ行政、コトヲ云シテ居ル、テハ
ナイ。實方ハ最高權限ヲ持テ居ナリトウ」見エハカラ、コシカラハ
實方ガ深シスルヲ禁シス。又今カラハ軍司令長官トハ「該ヲ
シス。」次ニ司令長官ハ返却スル様ニ云ベシタが、全蘭印東印度軍

Doc. 2674A

No. 4

ラ背負ひテ居ルノゾムベ其ニテ全領域、降服ヲ受諾シ。總督がエツク「こしハ私、權限外テスカラ私、此處ヲ為行キス。而シテ彼ハソウニト作ラ起上リ部屋ヲ出テ行ツフ。入口、所テ彼ハ又「寧莫班員ヲ追拂ッテ下サイマセニカト極ニブ。彼等ハ敵テハアツクガ、私ハ彼等、態度ハ立派タト思ハサルヲ得ナ。總督シエル・シ・スカルトニベルグ / SHELDON STARKENBERG / ハ今年五十四歳テアリが、身長高々、中肉テ、黒ラニク又大吉漢男子テ四十四、五歳位、若ヰニ見エタ。彼ハ四十年テ東印度ニビ七十萬住民、殿様ニナツカカラユ、年半モ此處ニ住ニテ居ル、テ疑モナ。和蘭人寧モ有能ナル人、一人テアリ。彼ハ收拾不可能十事能ニ直面シテ居リトグラモ、シカモ彼ハ事が甘、行カナシ場合ニハ生キテ歸ラズ、又全東印度領域が敗北シコトヲ知テ居テ尚且總督トニテ、威儀ヲ保テ居タ。彼、立派ナ態度ハ「シニガモ」一山テ見タペー・ア・ヒル / PERCIVAL / 、シテ比較スルコトが出来ナ。和蘭人ナニヤカナ駆引スル人種ハ世界、何處ニモナ。今日此、瞬間ニ於テスラ彼等ハ、駆引きスルモノ未タ、ダ。ヨーロ方テ彼等ハ恐ラフ一年前、日本、經濟使節ヲ団ラセタニ達ニナ。コヘ我々が「シニガモ」一山ニ居トオトコリ居ル。蘭領印度、戰場ハ東西数千程ニ及バ。我々が全領域、軍隊ニ直ナ、停戦ヲ命シトテモ、ヨーロ宮殿ニ傳達ナハモ、テナトコトハ判ナキ。荷蘭司令官ニ降服ニ附スニ也。荷蘭コトニテ、ヨーロ宮殿ニ附セテカラ被軍司令官ハ私ガ貴方ニ文ク要求、明九日、朝、司令官自身テ東印度会議、東印度軍ニ放送ニテレバナリセシ、放送が東部ニ於テ聽取ヤトバ、貴方ハ信實ナ降服ヲ確認ニテレバナリセシ。

Doc 2674A

時九日、貴方ハ午後四時ニ度既定ニキトニ我ガ軍、奥ホスル條件
ニ就テ報告ヲシテ下サイ」と言ふ。總督、司令官及以ノ參謀將校ハ降服
トイコ、饑足スベキ考ヲ厭ケラム。降服條件全部ヲ見アシテ立云。一
特別、好意ニ致テ彼等ハ日隨ニナシテ歩哨報ヲ通過スルコトヲ許シ。一
夕九日ノ午前十時三十分ニ司令長官が司令部/TAI意味明カド
アルニ斯ク譯ス。於テ放進スルヲ聞キ。彼ノ声ハ震ヘテ居テ。彼ノ要求が
ホシナヨリモズット丁度第三全軍ニ降服ヲ放送シテ。彼等/蘭印軍/ハ不
利ノ状況在ツタニ達メ。夕方司令長官ハ命セレキ通りヲ示ス。
軍司令官ハ更ニノ要求ヲ放シ。〇〇部隊長ハ先づ軍司令部ニ行ク。一
ソレカラ司令長官ト一緒ニナチ。彼等ハ「バンドン」要塞入ルヂアル。九日夜、軍
暴部/「バンドン」エヌ/ル/國ノ村ニ露營シ。三月十日ハ要塞ニ凱旋
入城ヲ行時ト是メラレタリ。軍參謀將校ト一緒ニ〇〇部隊長、司令部ニ
行ク。其之が「バンドン」ニ着イタ時ハ天暗カツ。ソレ晩邊ノ以前ノ不
マンホナル「HOMAN」ニメ。ヨコハ二年前泊マタコト「ホーナー」ニア
ル。ジヤバ/JAVA/ハ遂ニ落ヤタ。固難ヲ作戰上陸後僅ニ一週間ア
是了シタ。コトハ計画ヨリモ少ト早カツ。「ミンガホール」陷落シ三月十五
日夜幸福感漫リテガラ空ヲ見上ケ帝ナシナリ且見體くシ而シテ「ブキテ」
山/BOEKITEMA Hill/ノ指揮所、芝生、所ア開イテ鼓舞スル諸々起
出シ船メシ。ノ一復頃ニ歌ヲ流シ心、中ハ詩モナク歌モナク北、空ヲ眺
メ居テカ、独り詩句カヘニ中浮シ。私ハ一昨年始スヨコノ萬リ見面シキコト
5 同シ部屋ニ泊マリア、寂ヤリテモ、歌一言も無、心ヲ明ルヲシナカタ。
私ノ最も感動ヲ受ケタル瞬間ニ於テサヘ涙モ流レ
ス歌モ出ナカタ。コレハ實際筆紙ニ盡シ難キ感慨アル。

No.

DOB 2674-A

證 明 書

余、ジエラル・ブランケンシップ/Jewell A. Blankenship/中尉
記録情報組主任將校、所屬軍部翻譯部、出版物第三
十二號、一部名「各國國際檢察司之書」(六四三號)一九四三年、昭和
十七年、三月附、中佐、ペトロフ、モロコシ、聯合軍部翻譯
部、堪能化翻譯者、英譯、文化邦語日本文書、英譯十二卷
三證明人。

余、更に日本語文書原本合口ハシア/Washington D.C./地圖
監領市華盛頓文書本部へ添附セラル・ブランケンシップ/中尉
證明人。

步兵 中尉

ジエラル・ブランケンシップ/署名

/Jewell A. Blankenship/

✓ 6

Ex. # 1343

DOCUMENT 2674▲

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ALLIED TRANSLATOR AND INTERPRETER SECTION

SOUTH WEST PACIFIC AREA

ENEMY PUBLICATIONS

No:

32

Date:

11 Aug '43

CONTENTS

ACCOUNT OF THE NETHERLANDS

EAST INDIES OPERATION

Feb - Mar '42

Handwritten loose sheets, containing an account of the N.E.I. Op as related by "a Lt-Col", apparently copied from the OSAKA MAINICHI.

(POPOONDETTA - 19 Nov '42)

/s/ Sidney F. Mashbir

SIDNEY F. MASHBIR,
Colonel, S.C.,
Co-ordinator.

CONFIDENTIAL - BRITISH SECRET

1343

2

DOCUMENT 2674 A

Page 1

BARGAINING UNTIL THE LAST MOMENT.

Cowardly Surrender.

At 1600 hrs, we arrived at the aerodrome. HQ was at the side of the aerodrome. In one of the HQ rooms there were a number of high ranking DUTCH INDIES officers and also about 10 men wearing civilian clothes, so I realized for the first time that the Governor General was here. There was an interview with the enemy Governor General and his subordinates shortly afterwards in the house of a certain officer of the DUTCH INDIES Flying School. It was in a neat room. There was a long table in the centre. Three generals, the Army Comdr, the Army Chief of Staff and BUTAI Comdr ENDO were seated on the right. Behind these, sat the Staff Officers. Governor General STARKENBERG and his subordinates came in. Across from the Army Comdr was the Governor General, on the left of him was the Army Comdr in Chief TERPOORTEN, next were various Staff Officers, while the enemy staffs and civilian officials stood in the rear. The Governor General and Army Comdr in Chief were questioned by Comdr IMAMURA as to what power they possessed. Governor General stated that he does not have the prerogative of supreme command which was a very strange thing. It is a funny thing that from long ago, the military and civilian services were in the hands of the DUTCH INDIES Governor General yet only the Navy was under the direct control of the Queen. I don't know if it was the evading of the responsibility on the arrival of WAVELL that caused the trouble. And again when the Army Comdr asked, "Will you surrender unconditionally?" the Governor General was calm, shook his head. Then he said, "Just a moment, I don't know whether he is a reporter or a photographer by the door, so will you please have him removed." "In that case, why did you come?" asked the General. "You asked me, so I accepted your invitation and came. I was planning to discuss the matter with the JAVA Civil Administration," he retorted. Next he faced the Comdr in Chief of the Army and asked "Will you surrender unconditionally?" "Please only accept the surrender of BANDUNG." "The BANDUNG Area is not a problem as far as we are concerned." "The only problem is, are you willing to surrender unconditionally, or do you refuse to surrender the DUTCH INDIES?" He said, "I know very well that we are not an enemy of the JAPANESE Army." At that time the Governor General stared pointedly at the Comdr in Chief of the Army. No matter how many times he was questioned, he only mentioned the armistice of BANDUNG.

General IMAMURA solemnly said "There is no use for further questioning. If you don't surrender unconditionally, there isn't any other way but to / attack

1343 3

DOCUMENT 2674A

Page 2

attack continuously. Your comdr will return to BANDUNG immediately. You will be protected by our troops up to the sentry line, but if you step over the sentry line, we will attack BANDUNG with our aircraft which are on the aerodrome loaded with bombs. However, I will give you this last chance to consider. I will give you ten minutes from now to make the final decision," and so saying he arose. When the ten minutes time was up, IMAMURA stood up and faced the Governor General. "We are not referring to the administration. You do not seek to have supreme authority, so henceforth I will prohibit you from speaking. I will speak only to the Comdr in Chief of the Army from now." Next the Comdr in Chief was asked to reply but the man responsible for the entire NEI Army withered and agreed to surrender the entire area. Governor General said "This is out of my jurisdiction so I shall leave," and so saying, he arose and left the room. At the entrance he again requested "Will you remove the photographer?" Although they are the enemy I cannot help but admire their attitude. Governor General Sheldon STARKENBERG is 54 this year, however, he appears as young as 44 or 45, being tall, medium built, manly and very handsome. He has resided here for 5½ years since he is lord of the EAST INDIES and 70,000,000 inhabitants in his forties so he is without a doubt one of the most capable men of HOLLAND. Although he was facing an impossible situation he maintained his dignity as a Governor General while knowing that he will not return alive if anything goes wrong and that the entire EAST INDIES area was defeated. His splendid attitude cannot be compared with that of PERCIVAL whom I saw in SINGAPORE. There is no race in the world that bargain as the DUTCH do. Even today, at this very moment they came to negotiate a bargain. In this manner they probably posterized the economic mission of a year ago. This is unlike the time we were in SINGAPORE. The battlefield of the DUTCH INDIES extended east and west several thousands km. Although we ordered the forces in the entire area to cease fighting immediately we know that this cannot be transmitted easily. The Army HQ Comdr asked various questions in regard to surrendering to the Army Comdr. After obtaining the signature on this, he said, "The demands which I gave you, must be broadcast by the Comdr himself to the EAST INDIES forces of the entire EAST INDIES area tomorrow morning, the 9th. When that broadcast is heard in the east, you must confirm your bona fide surrender. Tomorrow, the 9th, you will come here again at 1600 hrs and will report on the conditions which our army demands." The Governor General, Comdr and his Staff Officers disliked this odious idea of surrendering but they completed all the items of surrendering and departed. They will receive special kindness by being permitted to pass through the sentry line without being blindfolded. At 1030 hrs on the 9th, I heard a broadcast made by the Army Comdr at the Army Comdr TAI. His voice shock. He broadcasted to his entire army the surrender in a much more civil way than the demands indicated. They must have been in a bad situation. In the evening the Comdr came as ordered.

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The

1343

4

DOCUMENT 2674 A

Page 3

The Army Condr made a further demand. The OO BUTAI Condr first went to the Army HQ and then together with the Condr in Chief, they will enter the fortress of BANDUNG. On the night of the 9th, Army HQ bivouacked in a village in the country N of BANDUNG. 10 March has been set as the time for making the triumphant entry into the fortress, so I journeyed with the Army Staff Officer to HQ of the OO BUTAI Condr. It was dark when we arrived at BANDUNG. Late that night, I went into a room of the old HOMAN Hotel where I stayed over 2 years ago. JAVA finally fell. The difficult operation was completed only one week after the landing, which was much quicker than we had planned. On the night of 15 Feb, when SINGAPORE fell, I looked up at the Southern Cross hopefully and began to recollect the inspiring tale which was told at the command post lawn of BOEKITEN Hill. That night, by just looking at the northern skies with tears on my cheeks and without a poem or song in my mind a doggerel verse formed in my mind. Even on the same night as I first saw this island the year before last and stayed at the same room, not even a word of the song enlightened my mind. Tears did not flow or was there a song even in my most inspiring moments. This is really an indescribable feeling.

1343 5

DOCUMENT 2674A

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Jewell A. Blankenship, 1st Lt. OIC R&I Files -----
hereby certify that the attached International Prosecution Section
Document No. 2674, a portion of ATIS Enemy Publication No. 32,
being a translation of loose bound handwritten notes of a Lt. Col.
dated Feb and March 1942, is an English translation of a captured
Japanese document rendered into English by a competent ATIS
translator.

I further certify that the original Japanese document was
forwarded to the Washington Document Center, Washington, D.C.

/s/ Jewell A. Blankenship
1st Lt. Inf.

"Course of Events Leading up to Decisions on Political Control and Reversion of the East Indies in the Second World War."

1. Prior to the outbreak of World War II various estimations were made by the Supreme Command and the government regarding the problem of political control and reversion of the southern occupied areas, including the Dutch Indies. From the outset, however, the Foreign Ministry had attached importance to the independence of the Dutch Indies.

Shortly before the start of landing operations in the Dutch Indies the General Headquarters of the Southern Army, in order to facilitate political administration after the operations and occupation, had given publicity to the independence for the Indonesian race by the use of the radio facilities in Saigon and Bangkok. At the same time, the Netherlands Government had sent back to Java, Soekarno and Hatta, both leaders of the Indonesian racial movement, who were then in exile, and had urged them to organize the Indonesian militia in resistance to the Japanese Army. As a reward for this, independence was to be granted to the East Indies area, but they seem to have both refused this proposal. After the occupation of the Dutch Indies by the Japanese Army, the army authorities on the spot allowed these racialists to take the lead, as in Burma and the Philippines, where independence was later declared, and invited them to establish the Java Public Service Association (the Java Kokokai), and other organizations for cooperation with the Japanese, among the native inhabitants. They pressed their administrative policies towards strengthening racialist tendencies. On the other hand, the General Headquarters of the Southern Army then in Singapore, maintained a policy of suppressing this tendency. The government at home, too, had no alternative but the extreme policy of bringing the Dutch Indies under Japan's direct control and checking the policy of racial liberation, in order to secure the resources necessary for the execution of the war. For this reason, the Supreme Command emphasized its strong opposition to the independence of the East Indies.

Consequently, the plan for the reversion of occupied areas, decided at the Liaison Conference of the government and Imperial Headquarters on 4 January 1943, stipulated independence only for Burma and the Philippines, and mentioned that independence for other areas would be decided later. Then, at the Imperial Conference of 31 May 1943, it was decided to make it their policy to incorporate the East Indies areas into Japanese territory, and to allow the participation in politics of native inhabitants according to their abilities.

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It was also decided not to announce this reversion plan so that the Allied Powers might not take advantage of it for propaganda purposes.

At the time of this decision Prime Minister Tojo was rather in favour of independence and the Foreign Ministry also supported the plan, but the Supreme Command maintained strong opposition, as mentioned above; while others again, took the stand that once independence was granted, Japan, for the sake of her personal honour would have to respect the independence to the last, and would be in a difficult position when negotiations, peace, etc., came one day to be considered, and that for this reason the status quo should be maintained. Territorial incorporation was thus finally decided on.

2. Though the Japanese Army authorities on the spot were greatly dissatisfied with this decision, they made no representations of their opposition. Mr. Soekarno, who visited Japan soon after the Greater East Asia Conference, made an earnest request to Prime Minister Tojo to grant the East Indies area her independence. The meeting, however, ended without any definite reply from Tojo and Soekarno returned to Java greatly disappointed.

Hayashi, Chief of the Justice Administration,

Later, Hayashi, chief of the Foreign Ministry, who was then Supreme Councillor for the Military Administration in Java, came to Tokyo, by approval of the Supreme Commander of the Japanese Army on the spot, with the problem of independence for the East Indies, and did his utmost to get it accepted by the circles concerned. Foreign Minister Shigemitsu supported the proposal and made efforts for the alteration of the decision mentioned above. With the formation of the Keiso Cabinet, the arguments for independence gradually began to carry more weight.

For instance, at the first War Supervision Conference of the Koiso Cabinet, it was decided, in an article of "The Policies to be Taken in the Future for the Supervision of the War", that a statement concerning independence for the East Indies should be declared at the next Diet Session. As for the circumstances which had led to this decision, the Mariana defense line on the Pacific front had been broken and the United States was rapidly turning to the offensive. The situation was such that the new Cabinet had to take some new measures for uniting Greater East Asia, and it was only natural that the Foreign Ministry should insist upon the plan for independence. The central authorities of the army now also inclined to approve of this plan in compliance to the requests from the army authorities on the spot, for the reason that racial consciousness had been noticeably enhanced in Java and Sumatra, the areas under Army Military Administration, that thanks to

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2. Though the Japanese Army authorities on the spot were greatly dissatisfied with this decision, they made no representations of their opposition. Mr. Soekarno, who visited Japan soon after the Greater East Asia Conference, made an earnest request to Prime Minister Tojo to grant the East Indies area her independence. The meeting, however, ended without any definite reply from Tojo and Soekarno returned to Java greatly disappointed.

Hayashi, Chief of the Justice Administration,

Later, Hayashi, Chief of the Justice Administration, who was then Supreme Councillor for the Military Administration in Java, came to Tokyo, by approval of the Supreme Commander of the Japanese Army on the spot, with the problem of independence for the East Indies, and did his utmost to get it accepted by the circles concerned. Foreign Minister Shigenatsu supported the proposal and made efforts for the alteration of the decision mentioned above. With the formation of the Koiso Cabinet, the arguments for independence gradually began to carry more weight.

For instance, at the first War Supervision Conference of the Koiso Cabinet, it was decided, in an article of "The Policies to be Taken in the Future for the Supervision of the War", that a statement concerning independence for the East Indies should be declared at the next Diet Session. As for the circumstances which had led to this decision, the Mariana defense line on the Pacific front had been broken and the United States was rapidly turning to the offensive. The situation was such that the new Cabinet had to take some new measures for uniting Greater East Asia, and it was only natural that the Foreign Ministry should insist upon the plan for independence. The central authorities of the army now also inclined to approve of this plan in compliance to the requests from the army authorities on the spot, for the reason that racial consciousness had been so noticeably enhanced in Java and Sumatra, the areas under Army Military Administration, that thanks to

leaving

leaving the problem of independence so vague, it was gradually becoming difficult to secure the cooperation of the native inhabitants.

The naval authorities, however, still maintained such strong opposition, that the promotion of the independence policy was entirely deferred as far as the areas under the Navy's Military Administration were concerned. (Annex I).

For this reason, no definite policy was decided in regard to independence, except that Prime Minister Koiso merely made a statement at the Diet Session to the effect that the independence for the East Indies area would be encouraged in the future. (Annex II).

3. Subsequently, the war situation took a turn for the worse and sea-transportation between Japan and the South was definitely at an end. For this reason, demands for economic self-sufficiency by the troops on the spot were greatly increased, and it became notably difficult to win the hearts of the native inhabitants of Java and Sumatra by mere abstract statements about independence.

The army authorities on the spot had previously established a Central Advisory Council in Java, in accordance with the policy of political participation for the native inhabitants, but this was no more than a consultative body for political administration. The deciding of a definite policy for the preparation of independence thus became an imminent problem.

The navy, on the other hand, no longer had any further reason to adhere to its past opposition views, as the abandonment of the South had already been taking place since the fall of the Philippines.

Since the beginning of 1945, the opinions of the army and the navy had become uniform over the problem of independence for the East Indies, and other matters.

Consequently, after the following discussion was held by the authorities concerned of the three Ministries at the Supreme Advisory Conference of July 17th, it was decided that, "The Empire shall recognize the independence of the East Indies at the earliest possible opportunity. For this purpose, preparations for independence shall be immediately promoted and intensified." (Annex III) and (Annex IV).

Less than a month later the Empire had surrendered and this was never put into effect.

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Doc. No. 2754

C E R T I F I C A T E
Statement of Identification

I, Hayashi Kaoru, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the capacity of Chief, Archives Section, Foreign Office, and that as such official on November 14, 1946, I executed certificates of source and authenticity with respect to I.P.S. documents Nos. 2754 (entitled "Course of Events Leading up to Decisions on Political Control and Revision of the East Indies in the Second World War"), 2755 (entitled "Letters Pertaining to the Measures for the Independence of the N.I.I., Proposed by Members of the Various Ministries Concerned"), 2758 (entitled "Measures for the N.E.I. Independence, Data for Foreign Minister's Explanation, 17 July, 1945") and 2759 (entitled "Supreme War Directive Council Decision No. 27, 17 July 1945, Letters Concerning Steps for E.I. Independence").

I further certify, that I.P.S. documents Nos. 2755, 2758 and 2759 are the annexes, respectively I, III and IV, referred to in I.P.S. document 2754.

Signed at Tokyo
on this 3rd day of December 1946 Signed: K. Hayashi

Foreign Office
Japanese Government

Witness: /s/ Nagahara Odo (SEAL)

Statement of Official Procurement:

I, Richard V. Larsen, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this
3 day of December 1946

Signed: Richard V. Larsen
Investigator I.P.S.

Witness: s/ Wm. C. Prout

Doc 2754

Ex / 322

1.

第二次世界大戦中ニ於ケル東印度、統治及
衛國決定ニ關スル經緯

一、第二次世界大戦勃發前蘭印ヲ含ム南方占領地
域ノ統治問題ノ問題ハ統帥部及政府内部ニ於
テ種々研究サルルトコロアリタルモ外務省ハ
當初ヨリ蘭印獨立ヲ重安観セリ蘭印上陸作戦
開始直前南方軍總司令部ハ作戦反占領後ノ施
政ヲ容易ナラシメンガ爲「サイゴン」及「バ
ンコック」、「ラジオ」ヲ利用シ「インドネ
シア」民族自立、宣傳ヲ行ヒタルガ同時期ニ
於テ、和洋ハ死刑中ナリシ「インドネシア」
民族運動指導者「スカル」及「ハツタ」ノ兩
氏ヲ「ジャバ」ヘ送遷シ右ニ對シテ「インド
ネシア」國民軍ヲ組織シテ日本軍ニ抵抗スヘ
キコトヲ懲諭シ其代價トシテ東印度地域ニ獨立ヲ許容スヘントナシタルモ兩氏ハ之ヲ拒絕
セル經緯アリタルモノノ如シ日本軍ノ蘭印占
領後現地軍當局ハ後ニ獨立聲明ノ行ハレタル
「ビルマ」「フィリピン」ニ於ケルト同様之
等民族主義者ヲ先頭ニ立テ「ジャワ」奉公會
其他現住民ノ對日協力組織ヲ設立セシムルト
共ニ民族主義的傾向ヲ強化スルカ如キ方向ヘ

2.

Doc 2754

施政ヲ押進スルトコロアリタルガ當時「シンガボール」ニ在リタル南方軍總司令部ハ逆ニ之ニ抑壓セントスルノ方針ヲ持シ中央ニ於テモ亦戰爭遂行ノ爲ノ資源獲得ニハ之ヲ直轄領トシテ徹底セル政策ヲ採用スルノ外ナク獨立許容等ノ民族解放政策ハ之ヲ阻害スヘシトノ理由ニテ統帥部ハ東印度獨立ニ强硬ナル反對ヲ主張セリ其結果昭和十八年一月四日大本營政府連絡會議決定占領地歸屬腹案ハ「ビルマ」「フイリツビン」ノミノ獨立ヲ規定シ其他ニ關シテハ追テ定ムトナシタルガ次テ同年五月三十一日御前會議決定ハ東印度地域ヲ帝國領土へ編入スヘキコトヲ決定シ現住民ノ民度ニ應シ政治參與ヲ認ムルカ如キ方策ヲ取ルト共ニ聯合國側宣傳ニ乘セラレザル様本歸屬決定ヲ發表セザル事トセリ。本決定ニ際シ東條總理大臣ハ寧ロ獨立論ニ領キ居リ外務省又獨立案ヲ主張セルガ統帥部ハ前述ノ如ク强硬ナル反對論ヲ持シ又一部ニハ一度獨立ヲ許容セバ帝國トシテハ信義トシテ敢ク迄之ヲ尊重セザルヲ得ズ將來交渉平和等考慮サルル場合困難ナル地位ニ立ツヘキヲ以テ現状ノ儘ヲ可トス

Doc 2754

3.

ヘントノ見解モアリテ遂ニ領土騒入ノ決定ヲ
見タル次第ナリ

二、本決定ニ對シ現地軍當局ハ頗ル不滿ナリシモ
積極的ニ反対意見ヲ具申スルニ至ラズ又大東
亞會議直後來訪セル「スカルノ」氏ハ東條總
理大臣ニ對シ東印度地域ニ對スル獨立許容ヲ
懇請セルモ東條總理大臣ハ何等應答ヲ與フル
コトナクシテ會見ヲ終リタルヲ以テ「スカル
ノ」氏ハ多大ノ失望ヲ拘キ「ジャバ」へ歸還
セリ其後「ジャバ」軍政最高顧問タリシ林司
政長官ハ現地軍最高指揮官トノ諒解ノ下ニ上
京シ東印度獨立論ヲ持シテ關係方面ノ説得ニ
努ムハトコロアリ重光外務大臣ハ之ヲ文特シ
テ前記決定變更ノ努力ヲナシタルガ小磯内閣
成立ト共ニ東印度獨立論ハ漸有力化スルニ至
レリ

即小磯内閣最初ノ戰爭指導會議ニ於テ「今後
採ルヘキ戰爭指導ノ方策」中ノ一項ニ於テ次
期議會ニ於テ東印度獨立ニ關スル聲明ヲナス
コトニ決定ヲ見ルカ其ノ經緯ヲ見ルニ當時太
平洋正面ニ於テハ「マリヤナ」ノ防禦線崩壊
シテ米國ノ攻勢急速化シツツアリタル際ニシ
テ新内閣トシテハ大東亞結集上何等力新ナル

Doc 2754

4
政略上ノ手ヲ打タサルヲ得ザル情勢ニアリタル次第ニシテ外務省カ獨立論ヲ主張セルハ云フ迄モナキトコロナルガ陸軍中央モ亦陸軍軍政地域タリシ「ジャワ」「スマトラ」ニ於ケル民族意識ノ昂揚著シキモノアリ獨立問題ヲ不明確ナル情感ニ放置シツツ原住民ノ協力ヲ確保スルコト漸時困難トナリ居ルヲ以テ現地軍當局ノ要請ヲ容レ獨立論ニ贊意ヲ表スルニ至レリ。然レ共海軍側ハ依然トシテ強硬ナル反對意見ヲ持シ獨立施策ノ押進ニ對シ海軍軍政地域ニ關スル限り全面的留保ヲナシタルヲ以テ（附屬一）單ニ議會ニ於テ小磯内閣總理大臣ヨリ將來東印度地域ノ獨立ニ關シ支援ヲナスヘキ旨ノ聲明行ハレタルニ止リ（附屬二）獨立ニ關スル何等具體の方策ノ決定ヲ見ルニ至ラス

三、其後戰局ハ更ニ悪化シ南方地域トノ海上交通ハ事實上杜絶情態トナリタルヲ以テ現地ニ於ケル軍自活ノ爲ノ經濟的要求ハ増大シ「ジャバ」「スマトラ」ニ於テハ抽象的ナル獨立聲明ノミヲ以テシテハ原住民ノ人心把握ハ著シク困難トナレリ現地軍當局ハ義ニ原住民政治參與ノ方針ニ基キ「ジャバ」ニ中央參議院ヲ設置

2754

Doc

セルモ右ハ單ナル施政ニ對スル諭問機關タル
ニ過キザリシヲ以テ獨立準備ノ爲ノ具體の方
策ノ決定ハ焦眉ノ問題トナレリ
他方海軍側モ「フィリピン」失陷後ハ南方放
棄ハ既ニ現實化シ來リタルヲ以テ從來ノ反對
論ヲ固持スルノ理由ヲ喪失シ昭和二十年初頭
ヨリ東印度獨立問題ニ關スル外國海、主張ハ
漸次統一セラルニ至レリ依テ三省關係官、
間ニ付次、討議ヲ經タル結果七月十七日最高
指導會議ニ於テ「帝國ハ可及的遠カニ東印度
ノ獨立ヲ容認ス之ヲ爲直ナニ獨立準備ヲ促進
強化スルモノトス」トノ決定ヲ見タルモ（附
屬三）及（附屬四）其後一ヶ月弱ニシテ帝國
ノ降伏トナリタルヲ以テ之カ實施ヲ見スシテ
終ヒリ

5.

Doc. 2754

證 明 書
認 定 證 明

余於舊令年記資格於日本外務省會議上日本政府公關係在本文上。
這余該宣文中國檢察部會字文百零九字於本會於東印度工部總
督辦事處之關係于本年十二月三十日署印此件由總督署主辦者果示
云委員會關節正工部總督署件於本年十二月三十日各文書局存
拿來審議會議定之本部總督署存本部會於本部總督署件傳到某
參照此函件在本年十二月三十日審定記會依此上指證明
余於國際檢察部會字文百零九字於本會於東印度工部總督署會
會事務處關節附總督署大司理及司理之件存入。

一千九百零六年西和二十一年十一月三日

署名於下署名

日本外務省 林馨 署名
證人 戶長春 署名 印

一千九百零六年十一月三日

余於本年十一月三日 RICHARD H. LARSH 余聯合國最高檢察官總
司令部關係於本年十一月三日記證明今於本席上日本政府公關係宣文
事務處存於本年十一月三日存入。

一千九百零六年西和二十一年十一月三日

署名於下署名

國際檢察部調查官 RICHARD H. LARSH 署名
證人 WILLIAM C. PROUT 署名